Cryptanalysis of Yang-Wang-Chang's Password Authentication Scheme with
  Smart Cards by Pathan, Al-Sakib Khan & Hong, Choong Seon
Cryptanalysis of Yang-Wang-Chang’s Password 
Authentication Scheme with Smart Cards  
 
Al-Sakib Khan Pathan and Choong Seon Hong 
Department of Computer Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Korea 
spathan@networking.khu.ac.kr and cshong@khu.ac.kr 
 
 
                              
  This work was supported by ITRC and MIC. Dr. CS Hong is the corresponding author. 
   Abstract  In 2005, Yang, Wang, and Chang proposed an 
improved timestamp-based password authentication scheme in 
an attempt to overcome the flaws of Yang-Shieh’s legendary 
timestamp-based remote authentication scheme using smart 
cards. After analyzing the improved scheme proposed by 
Yang-Wang-Chang, we have found that their scheme is still 
insecure and vulnerable to four types of forgery attacks. Hence, 
in this paper, we prove that, their claim that their scheme is 
intractable is incorrect. Also, we show that even an attack based 
on Sun et al.’s attack could be launched against their scheme 
which they claimed to resolve with their proposal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Remote user authentication using smart cards is a well-known 
method used in many electronic networking applications like 
e-trade, e-transactions, e-banking etc. With the growth of 
Internet and different networking applications, it has become a 
popular method for secure remote communications. So far, a 
number of timestamp-based remote user authentication 
schemes have been proposed, many of which cannot sustain to 
certain types of forgery attacks. In 1999, Yang and Shieh [1] 
proposed two authentication schemes using smart cards, one 
of which was the time-stamp based password authentication 
scheme. Later this scheme was found as faulty by several 
researchers and also some modifications were proposed. 
Yang-Wang-Chang’s scheme [2] has so far been considered as 
one of the well-standing alternate improved solutions for 
overcoming the vulnerabilities of [1]. But in this paper, we 
show that, their scheme is still vulnerable to four different 
types of forgery attacks, in spite of their claim of the scheme’s 
intractability.  
   The main contributions of this paper are: 
   1. We review the time-stamp based authentication scheme 
proposed by Yang, Wang, and Chang. 
   2. We show four different types of forgery attacks that could 
be launched against Yang-Wang-Change scheme and thus 
prove that, their scheme is not fully secure as they claimed in 
their paper. 
   The rest of the paper is structured as follows; Section 2 states 
the motivation for our work, Section 3 reviews the working 
method of Yang-Wang-Chang scheme, Section 4 presents the 
cryptanalysis and weaknesses of Yang-Wang-Chang scheme, 
and finally Section 5 concludes the paper summarizing our 
contributions with future research directions. 
 
2. Motivation of Our Work 
 
In an attempt of removing the flaws of Yang-Shieh’s scheme 
[1], Yang, Wang, and Chang have improved the working 
principle of [1] with some modifications in the computations 
of some parameters and in some checking steps. They, in their 
paper have referred to the attacks on [1] devised by Chan and 
Cheng [3]. They have also pointed how Sun and Yeh [4] 
showed the vulnerability of [1]. Hence, they went for an 
improvement for the scheme presented in [1]. 
   After analyzing the improved scheme proposed by 
Yang-Wang-Chang, we have found that, it is still vulnerable to 
a type of forgery attack based on [4]. Also, we devise other 
new forgery attacks that could be applied against their scheme. 
Hence, we prove that, Yang-Wang-Chang scheme could not 
be a secure scheme to be used for password authentication of 
the remote users using smart cards. 
  
3. Review of Yang-Wang-Chang Scheme 
 
In this section, we review Yang-Wang-Chang password 
authentication scheme [2] using smart cards. First, we note 
down the terms and preliminaries used throughout the rest of 
the paper. 
3.1   Basic Terms  
Ui – The ith user seeking for authentication by the server 
KIC – The Key Information Center which is responsible for 
generating key information, issuing smart cards to new users, 
and serving password-changing requests for registered users 
IDi – The identity of the user Ui 
PWi – The password chosen by the user Ui 
CIDi – The identity of the smart card generated by the server 
associated with the user Ui 
f(.) – A one-way function 
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3.2   Yang-Wang-Chang’s Timestamp-Based Scheme 
As this scheme is a modified and enhanced version of 
Yang-Shieh scheme [1], it also has three phases for the 
password authentication process; registration phase, login 
phase, and authentication phase. The three phases are 
described in the following subsections. 
 
Registration Phase. In this phase, the KIC sets up the 
authentication system and issues smart cards to user Ui who 
requests for registration. It is assumed that, this phase occurs 
over a secure channel. At first, the Ui securely submits IDi and 
PWi to the KIC. Then, the steps that the KIC follows are: 
 
   1. Two large prime numbers p and q are generated, and n= 
p•q is computed. 
   2. A public key e and corresponding secret key d are chosen 
which satisfy, e•d ≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1). 
   3. An integer g is found which is a primitive element in both 
GF(p) and GF(q), where g is the public information of the KIC. 
It should be noted that, GF(p) and GF(q) mean p and q are 
finite fields. 
   4. A smart card identifier CIDi is generated for the user Ui 
and Si is computed as, Si = IDiCIDi•d  mod n. 
   5. hi for Ui is computed such that, hi = gPWi• d  mod n. 
   6. Then the information n, e, g, IDi, CIDi, Si, hi and f(.) are 
written into the smart card’s memory and the card is issued to 
the user Ui 
 
Login Phase. When Ui needs to login to the system, the smart 
card should be attached to the login device, and IDi and PWi 
need to be keyed in. After that, the smart card performs the 
following operations: 
 
   1. Generates a random number ri  
   2. Computes Xi and Yi as follows: 
Xi = g PWi• ri  mod n 
Yi = Si•hiri• T  mod n 
where, T is the current timestamp. 
   3. Sends the login request message, M = {IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, 
e, g, T} to the remote server. 
 
Verification Phase. In this phase, the system or the server 
determines the validity of the received login request message 
and decides whether to accept the access of the user or not. So, 
after the server has received the message M, it carries out the 
following steps: 
 
   1. Checks the validity of IDi and CIDi. If the formats of these 
are incorrect, the server rejects the login request. 
   2. Checks whether the condition (T′-T) ≤ ∆T holds or not, 
where T′ is the timestamp of receiving the login request 
message and ∆T is the legitimate time interval allowed for the 
transmission delay. If it is negative, the server rejects the 
request. 
   4. Checks the equation, Yie ≡ IDiCIDi•Xi,T  mod n. If it holds, 
then the remote server accepts the login request and gives 
access to the Ui. 
 
4. Forgery Attacks on Yang-Wang-Chang’s 
Scheme 
 
In this section, we show the vulnerabilities of 
Yang-Wang-Chang’s proposed scheme. We show first two 
attacks based on some of the previously shown attacks on 
timestamp based password authentication scheme. Third and 
fourth attacks are our novel attacks that could also be launched 
successfully on Yang-Wang-Chang’s scheme. 
4.1   Attack Based on [4] and [5]  
As the attacker could intercept the login request message M = 
{IDi, CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, e, g, T}, it can get the valid values of IDi 
and CIDi. Using these values it could launch a forgery attack 
as follows: 
  
   1. Let Ta be the timestamp for the attacker’s login request. 
Use the Extended Euclidean algorithm to compute gcd(e, Ta) = 
1 that is, e and Ta are relatively prime. Let, u and v be the 
coefficients computed by the extended Euclidean algorithm 
such that, e•u –Ta•v = 1 
   2. Compute Xf = IDiCIDi • v mod n 
   3. Compute Yf = IDiCIDi • u mod n 
   4. Send the forged login request message Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, 
Yf, n, e, g, Ta} and this request will eventually pass the 
authentication phase as, 
Yf e = (IDiCIDi • u) e mod n 
 = (IDiCIDi ) eu mod n 
 = (IDiCIDi ) 1+Ta• v mod n 
 = IDiCIDi • (IDiCIDi ) Ta• v mod n 
 = IDiCIDi •(Xf) Ta  mod n 
   In fact, this attack could be extended for gcd(e,a)=2,3,…. 
instead of only gcd(e, a) = 1. Hence, the claim that their 
improved scheme is resistant to Sun et al.’s [4] attack or 
similar attacks is not correct. 
4.2   Forgery Attack Based on Yang et al.’s [6] Attack  
In this attack the attacker intercepts the message, M = {IDi, 
CIDi, Xi, Yi, n, e, g, T} and then: 
 
   1. Finds a value w such that it satisfies, w•Ta = T, where Ta 
denotes the attacker’s attack launching time. 
   2. Computes the equation, Xf = Xiw = gri•PWi•w mod n 
   3. Now, the attacker constructs the forged login request 
message as, Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, Yi, n, e, g, Ta} 
   This forged message eventually passes the authentication 
phase of [2] because: 
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Yie = (Si•hiri• T)e mod n 
 = (IDiCIDi • d• gPWi•d• ri• T)e mod n 
 = IDiCIDi•gPWi• ri• T mod n 
                                               and, 
IDiCIDi •Xf Ta   mod n = IDiCIDi • gri•PWi•w• Ta  mod n 
 = IDiCIDi • gPWi• ri• T mod n 
4.3   Our Novel Impersonation Attack 
An attacker can impersonate a legitimate user Ui, with identity 
IDi, by using the following procedure: 
 
   1. It Intercepts the login request message M = {IDi, CIDi, Xi, 
Yi, n, e, g, T}.  
   2. Computes, IDf = IDi-1 mod n 
   3. Now, the attacker submits the identity IDf and a random 
value as his password to the KIC to obtain a valid smart card 
with information {n, e, g, IDf, CIDf, Sk, hk and f(.)}. 
   4. Since, in the registration phase, Si = IDiCIDi•d mod n and 
here, Sk = IDfCIDi•d mod n = IDi-CIDi•d mod n, the attacker can 
compute Si as, Si = Sk-1 mod n 
   5. Then, the attacker chooses a random integer y. 
   6. Sets, Xf = ye mod n and Yf = Si•yTf mod n, where Tf is the 
timestamp for the login request from the attacker and sends the 
forged login message, Mf = {IDi, CIDi, Xf, Yf, n, e, g, Tf}. The 
request is validated as the login request from the user Ui 
because, 
Yf e = (Si•yTf)e mod n 
 = (Sk-1•yTf)e mod n 
 = IDiCIDi•d•e • yTf•e mod n 
 = IDiCIDi •(Xf)Tf mod n 
4.4   Our Novel Forgery Attack 
The attacker can get the values of IDi and CIDi from the login 
request message from the valid user, and the smart card 
identifier CIDi is a fixed value for a particular login request 
from a user. The attacker could launch an attack using the 
following steps: 
 
   1. The attacker finds a value Tf such that, T•Tf ≡ 1 mod n 
where Tf is the attacker’s login timestamp 
   2. It chooses a random integer k and computes, Yf = k Tf mod 
n and sets Xf = IDi-CIDi•T•ke mod n. 
   3. Sends the forged login request message, Mf = {IDi, CIDi, 
Xf, Yf, n, e, g, Tf } 
   4. The attacker could pass the authentication phase as, 
 
Yf e = ke•Tf mod n 
and, 
IDiCIDi •Xf Tf mod n = IDiCIDi•(IDi-CIDi•T•ke)Tf mod n 
 = IDiCIDi•IDi-CIDi•T•Tf• ke•Tf mod n 
 = IDiCIDi•IDi-CIDi • ke•Tf mod n 
 = ke•Tf mod n 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Works 
 
After analyzing the Yang-Wang-Change scheme, we have 
found that, it fails to pass some tricky impersonation or 
forgery attacks. In this paper, with four different types of 
forgery attacks, we show that Yang-Wang-Change password 
authentication scheme is still vulnerable and hence, it cannot 
provide proper security according to their claim. As our future 
work, we would like to find out a solution for fixing up the 
vulnerabilities and to propose an improved scheme that could 
resist all these forgery attacks. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Yang, W.-H. and Shieh, S.-P., "Password Authentication Schemes with 
Smart Cards", Computers & Security, Vol. 18, No. 8, Elsevier, 1999, pp. 
727-733. 
[2] Yang, C. C., Wang, R.-C., and Chang, T.-Y., “An improvement of the 
Yang-Shieh password authentication schemes”, Applied Mathematics 
and Computation 162, Elsevier, 2005, pp. 1391-1396. 
[3] Chan, C.-K.  and Cheng, L. M., “Cryptanalysis of a Timestamp-Based 
Password Authentication Scheme”, Computers and Security, Vol. 21, No. 
1, Elsevier,  2002, pp. 74-76. 
[4] Sun, H.-M. and Yeh, H.-T., “Further Cryptanalysis of a Password 
Authentication Scheme with Smart Cards”, IEICE Transactions on 
Communications, Vol. E86-B, No. 4, 2003, pp. 1212-1215. 
[5] Chen, K.-F. and Zhong, S., “Attacks on the (Enhanced) Yang-Shieh 
Authentication”, Computers & Security, Vol. 22, No. 8, Elsevier, 2003, 
pp. 725-727. 
[6] Yang, C.-C., Yang, H.-W., and Wang, R. C., “Cryptanalysis of Security 
Enhancement for the Timestamp-Based Password Authentication 
Scheme using Smart Cards”, IEEE Transactions on Consumer 
Electronics, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2004, pp. 578-579.  
ISBN 978-89-5519-136-3 -1620- Feb. 17-20, 2008 ICACT 2008
